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As economies become more integrated in the midst of globalization, financial crisis that occurs in
one country can easily transmit to other countries, becoming global financial catastrophe in a short period
of time. In such event, strong economic fundamentals are particularly important to defend a country from
the contagious effect of the crisis. As evidence, due to the fragile economic fundamentals and lacking
government credibility, East Asian economies were easily attacked by the crisis in 1997 once the sentiment
deteriorated. Nevertheless, the region had learned its lessons in 1997 thereby proofing its resilience in
facing the global financial crisis that struck in 2008 by improving its economic fundamentals as well as
policymakers’ credibility. This paper starts with theories on economic growth and financial crisis. Further,
it empirically examines to what extent the financial crises in 1997 and 2008 affect East Asian economies
by using panel data econometrics. The evidence shows that, even though both crises have contributed
adverse impacts on East Asian economies, the magnitude of the 2008 crisis was relatively less severe than
that in 1997. Finally, this study also provides further discussions regarding how East Asian economies had
successfully minimized the impact of the global crisis in 2008.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the globalization era, the occurrence of financial crises has become more frequent
than before. One of the main reasons is the advancement in information technology, which, to
some extent, enlarges the magnitude of the crisis and acceleratesits spread to other regions or
countries. Another reason is the rapid development of financial sector.One of the examples is
the emergence of the so-called International Financial Integration (IFI). In this regard, Edison et
al. (2002) explain that IFI refers to as “the degree to which an economy does not restrict cross-
border transactions” (page 1). Hence, due to the integrated financial systems, the occurrence
of localized financial nuisance in one country can result in a domino effect by perplexing other
integrated economies, leading to a global financial havoc.
In the last two decades, at least two major financial crises occurred, namely the 1997
East Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. While the crisis in 1997 was due
to the lack of government transparency and credibility that led to structural and policy distortions
(see e.g. Corsetti et al., 1999), the economic turmoil in 2008 was mainly triggered by the rapid
innovation in financial products such as securitization practices and credit default swaps. It was
undermined further by property speculation and inaccurate credit ratings. In both cases, the
development of the crises spread to other regions and,in a short period,became global crises
due to the contagious effects amid globally integrated financial systems and rapid information
sharing.
Even though the sources of the crises may be varied, the consequences of financial crises
have always been associated with macroeconomic indicators, particularly economic growth.
For instance, during the East Asian crisis, East Asia plunged from being the fastest growing
region in the world to the region which several countries recorded negative income growth in
1998 such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Philippines and Thailand (Asian
Development Bank, 1999, Table A2). Later, Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea had to go to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for large bailout loan programs. On the other hand,
during the 2008 crisis, even though the source of crisis was due to the collapse of international
financial institutions in the west, especially those in the US and UK, some of East Asian countries
such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand were also dragged to the crisis by experiencing huge
financial encumbrance. Nevertheless, statistics shows that the impact of the crisis in 2008on
East Asian countries was not as deep as that in 1997. In addition,these countries managed to
recover rapidly. In this regard, many argue that East Asian countries have learned their lessons
in 1997 and endured the crisis in 2008 through fortified economic fundamentals.
Given these facts, it has become more important to conduct formal examination vis-à-vis
the causes and consequences of financial crises, particularly in the context of East Asian region.
Hence, the objective of this paper is to measure the impact of each financial crisis on economic
growth in East Asian economies. Further, it is also important to analyze how East Asian economies
managed to minimize the impact of 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Until now,even though there
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are already vast amount of literature analyzing the impact of the 1997 East Asian Financial
Crisis, most of these studies use the qualitative approach (for instrance, see Corsetti et al.,
1999; Lloyd and MacLaren, 2000; Jomo, 2001). In addition, due to its recent occurrence, the
study that examines the consequences of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is also limited. Hence,
this paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by introducing a quantitative methodology and
comparing the consequences of both crises in East Asian economies. The rest of this paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related theories on economic growth and financial
crises; Section 3 provides some methodology to measure the impact of both financial crises on
growth by using econometric modeling; Section 4 presents the empirical evidence and further
dicussions, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. THEORY
Growth Theories
Since the aim of this paper is to examine the impact of financial crises on economic
growth, firstly, it is necessary to derive the factors of growth from theoretical perspective. This
section, thus, introduces several growth theories that can be applied for the purpose of
methodology. According to the neoclassical view (e.g. Solow, 1956), growth is underpinned by
capital accumulation, which diminishes in the long run. As the consequence, a country will
reach its “steady-state” in the long run, i.e. zero economic growth. One of the implications of
this growth model is that the less developed countries with open economies may eventually
catch up with developed countries as capital flows from the rich to poor countries that can offer
higher returns on investment, resulting in economic convergence (Todaro and Smith, 2006).
On the other hand, the so-called “new growth theories” contradict this theory by
suggesting that a country does not necessarily experience “steady-state” in the long run. For
instance, a study by Lucas (1988) considers human capital as an endogenous variable of growth
and suggests that there are no diminishing returns to the combination of the accumulation of
human capital and capital goods, i.e. there is growth in the long run. These constant returnsto
scale are caused by the positive externality effects of knowledge, which affect the output of
individual firms in the economy. Another theory is proposed by Romer (1986, 1990), which
urges the importance of science and technology as the engine of economic growth. He argues
that there are capital spillovers created by firms, which, in turn, create knowledge. Knowledge,
which triggers positive externalities, will prevent growth to diminish in the long run.
In application, human capital and knowledge spillovers can be obtained through FDI
and, to lesser extent, trade. In the scope of developing world, Yao and Wei (2007) argue that
FDI can act as a means to transfer these factors from developed countries to developing countries
since FDI accelerates the speed of General Purpose Technology6 (GPT) and introduces advanced
6 General Purpose Technologies are technologies that have impact on the whole national economy, such as computer and automobile.
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technologies and know-how that do not exist in the developing countries. Developing countries,
thus, will utilise these factors as assets in order to enhance economic growth. Some literature,
however, suggest that FDI can distribute knowledge and know-how efficiently to a country
only if it meets several conditions. For instance, a hypothesis by Bhagwati (1994) points out
that trade policy plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of FDI in distributing
positive externalities in the country. In this regard, he argues that country with export orientation
can capture the spill over effects of FDI more efficiently and, thus, will have higher growth rate.
In short, this section shows that, based on the neoclassical growth theory, initial income
is an important factor of growth since countries with relatively lower initial income will grow
faster and catch up with those with higher initial income. Further, it also points out that capital
accumulation acts as the engine of growth in the short run. Meanwhile, new growth theories
argue that variables such as FDI and trade are also important in creating sustainable economic
growth in the long run by creating positive externalities through transfer of knowledge. Hence,
for the purpose of methodology, these variables are considered as the main determinants of
growth. Before proceeding to the methodology, however, this paper will first investigate the
typology of financial crises in the following section.
Typology ofFinancial Crisis
The Reserve Bank of Australia (2012) defines a stable financial system as the one in
which any activities of fund transfer from lenders to borrowers are being well accommodated
by financial intermediaries, market, and market structure. Financial instability, therefore, is a
condition where a collapse in financial system disrupts these activities and triggersa financial
crisis. Indeed systemic risks are always attached to any financial system, which according to
Davis (2001) is closely related to the wealth and soundness financial institutions. In other cases,
failure of market liquidity and breakdown of market infrastructure may also initiate the risks.
In his paper, Davis (2001) also outlines several theoretical framework that explain financial
instability, which include: 1)the debt and financial fragility theory, 2) disaster myopia theory,
and 3) bank runs theory.The debt and financial fragility theory argues that the economy follows
a cycle that consists of period of positive and negative growth (Fisher, 1933). With the upturn
of the economy, debt and risk taking activities increases. These create an asset bubble that will
lead to negative growth.  Meanwhile, disaster myopia theory suggests that financial instability
may be caused bycompetitive behaviour of financial institutions that lead to a condition where
the credibility of borrowers were neglected and risks were undermined (Herring, 1999). On the
other hand, the bank runs theory explains the condition in which panic investors sell their
assets or drawdown their funds for fear that economic condition will be worsened (Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983; Davis, 1994). As the consequence, this will lead to a sudden plunge in asset
prices and liquidity crisis.
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To their own extent, all of these three theories may explain the 1997 East Asian Financial
Crisis. Financial deregulations with inadequate regulatory supervision caused the asset bubble
that led to negative economic growth in East Asian economies. Meanwhile, the can rapid
expansion can also lead to credit crunch since credits were channelled recklessly to insolvent
borrowers in order to increase profitability. Last but not least, when investors realized that the
situation was already bad, they withdrew their funds, leading to massive capital outflows.
In addition to these basic theories, some literature suggest that financial instability can
also be caused by the role of international capital flows through international transmission,
such as trade patterns, exchange rate pressure and foreign investment, which causes the
“contagious effect” (see e.g. Chongvilaivan, 2010; Glock and Rose, 1998; Davis, 2001). For
instance, the Global Financial Crisis that occurred in 2008 was actually triggered by the Sub-
prime mortgage crisis originated in the US. Even though the crisis in the US can be explained by
the above theories, its spread to other regions, including East Asian region, was attributed to
the contagious effect of the Sub-prime mortgage crisis.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section provides research methodology in examining the impact of financial crises in
1998 and 2008 on East Asian economies. This paper collects data from World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) dataset for the period of 1990-2010. It obtains various
macroeconomic variables of the selected East Asia economies, including the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and other notable East Asian economies,
i.e. China, Japan and South Korea.
In order to examine the relationship between economic growth and financial crisis, it is
necessary to develop the growth determinants first. By following the previous studies (for
instance, seeBarro, 2001; Chongvilaivan, 2010), growth is determined as a function of initial
income, capital expenditure, investment, and trade. Then, this benchmark growth model is
augmented with the crisis dummy. As the result, this paper defines the empirical framework as
follows:
(1)
where the subscripts i, i= 1, 2, …, N, and t, t = 1, 2, …, T, denote an economy i at the
time period t, respectively.
The dependent variable, Growth, is the GDP per capita growth rate. The firstexplanatory
variable, Income, is the logarithmic form of GDP per capita. Next, Capital is the gross fixed
capital formation as a percentage of GDP, which is included in order to capture the country-
specific productivity levels (Siegel and Griliches, 1992; Siegel, 1997). The rationale is that,
higher portion of capital accumulation leads to higher productivity level, thus increasing income
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growth. FDI is the net foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. To some extent, the
role of FDI in contributing to growth is similar but not limited to that of capital. The reason is
because FDI also facilitates externalities and spillover effects, which enhance further the efficiency
of productivity of local firms (for instance, see Lim, 2001; Yao and Wei, 2007).Trade is a proxy
of international trade openness, which is measured by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP.
Chongvilaivan (2010) suggests that this variable represents the impacts of the global financial
crisis on an economy with respect to the commodity markets. Finally, a dummy variable, Crisis,
is included in the model. It takes the value of unity during crisis period, i.e. the 1998 East Asian
Financial Crisis and 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and zero otherwise. For more details about the
variables, please refer to Appendix 1.
From this model, income is expected to have a negative sign. The rationale is based on
the neo-classical Solow Swan model, which suggests that economies with lower income level
will grow faster and catch up those with higher income level, resulting in income convergence
(for instance, see Solow, 1956). On the other hand, capital and FDI are expected to have
positive relationships with growth.While the neo-classical Solow-Swan model suggests that all
type of capitals have similar role in contributing to economic growth, the “new growth theories”
suggests otherwise. As mentioned earlier, through FDI, these externalities can be transferred
from industrialised countries to the developing countries as important assets to enhance economic
growth further (for instance, see Yao and Wei, 2007). Due to this reason, this paper expects
the coefficient of FDI to be bigger compared to that of capital since it has bigger role in
contributing economic growth.
The relationship between trade openness and income growth is more complex, depending
on whether international trade causes trade creation or trade diversion. The former occurs
when international trade increases the welfare of the members of trade alliance without
sacrificing that of the non-members. On the other hand, the latter occurs when trade alliance
is formed at the expense of its non-members and thus welfare-decreasing. In this regard, the
relationship between trade openness and income growth depends on which of these influences
has stronger effect.
Lastly, the coefficient of crisis dummy is expected to be negative, which is intuitive.
Nevertheless, the coefficient of 1998 East Asian Financial Crisis is expected to be bigger than
that of 2008 Global Financial Crisis since, as mentioned earlier, East Asian countries had stronger
fundamentals and better resistance during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
Due to the panel nature of the data, this paper uses the fixed effects and random effects
methods for the estimation purpose. By using fixed effects, the model controls for unobserved
heterogeneity by assuming that each country has its own effects that may influence the
dependent variable. In this model, each country’s heterogeneity is captured by the intercept
and associated with the independent variables. Thus, the nature of fixed effects prevents the
estimation to suffer heterogeneous bias and thus the model always gives consistent results.The
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presence of fixed effects can be tested by conducting an F-test. The fixed effects are jointly
significant when the null is significantly rejected. Another model is the random effects model,
which assumes that the variation across countries is random and uncorrelated with the
independent variables. Different from the fixed effects model, the presence of random effects
can be tested by using a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test.
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
This section provides the estimation results of Equation (1). Nevertheless, before proceeding
to the results, it is necessary to justify the stationarity of the variables included in the model. As
shown earlier, this study utilizes data set that covers a long period, i.e. 21 years. Thus some
variables may contain a unit root. If unit root is present, these variables become non-stationary
and cause the traditional estimation methods cannot be used since they can result in a spurious
regression. In this case, a test for cointegration is necessary for the non-stationary variables.
There are several panel unit root tests that can be performed such as Hadri (2000), Levin,
Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). In this regard, this paper employs the
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) to test the presence of unit root in the variables. The results confirm
the stationarity of these variables since the null of a unit root is significantly rejected at the 5%
level for all variables (Appendix 4). Therefore it is not necessary to do the cointegration test.
Consequentially, Equation (1) can be estimated by using the fixed effects and random effects
model.
In addition, due to the nature of the data, serial correlation and/or heteroscedasticity
may present, which can lead to inconsistent and biased estimation results. Hence, this paper
corrects these problems by treating each country effects as a cluster in order to estimate the
correct standard errors with the Huber/White cluster-robust covariance estimator in all regressions.
Benchmark Growth Regression
The first column of Table 1shows the results of the fixed effects estimation, whereas the
second column shows the results of random effects estimation. Overall, the results are consistent
with economic theory and expectations. The first explanatory variable, income, is not significant
in the first column but significant at 1% in the second column with negative coefficient.
Next, capital is significant in both columns, even though the magnitude is bigger in the
random effects. Overall, despite the relatively higher magnitude, this result is consistent with
the previous studies (for instance, see Chongvilaivan, 2010). Hence, it proves that higher capital
accumulation results in higher productivity and enhances income growth.Further, FDI is also
significant at 1% and positively correlated with income growth in both regressions. In the fixed
effects model, according to expectation, the magnitude of FDI is bigger than capital, which is
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also consistent with the previous studies (for instance, see Stopford et al.,1991; Azman-Saini
and Ahmad, 2010). However, contradicting the result in the fixed effects model, the random
effects model shows that the coefficient of capital is slightly higher than that of FDI.
Lastly, trade has a negative sign and is only significant in the random effects. The weak
evidence of the relationship between trade openness and income growth may be attributed to
the presence of trade creation and trade diversion (Viner, 1950).If the effect of trade diversion
in the region is bigger than trade creation, trade openness will not result in output growth.
The F-test of the fixed effects strongly rejects the null, justifying the presence of a correlation
between the explanatory variables and heterogeneous effects in errors. In other words, the
fixed effects estimation provides unbiased and consistent estimators. On the other hand, the
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects is not significant at 10% level,
failing to reject the null of individual effects are equal, i.e. there are no random effects. As the
consequence, the random effects estimation is biased and inconsistent.
Economic Growth and Financial Crises
Next, the discussion of this paper moves to the impact of financial crises on economic
growth in East Asian economies. As shown in the methodology, this paper employs crisis
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dummy in order to measure the impacts of financial crises on East Asian economies. The first
crisis dummy is for the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis. In this regard, even though the crisis
struck in 1997, the dummy variable takes the value of unity in 1997-1998 by considering the
lagging effect of the crisis. The second one is for the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Similarly,
since the lagging effect also exists, the crisis dummy is assigned in the year when the crisis
struck and the following year, i.e.2008-2009.
Table 2 presents the benchmark growth model that is augmented by the crisis dummies.
In the first two columns, it is augmented with the 1997 East Asian Financial crisis. In general,
the relationship between growth determinants and income growth is consistent with the initial
benchmark regression.Next, as expected, the crisis dummy is significant in both models with
relatively similar magnitude. According to the estimation, under ceteris paribus, the presence
of East Asian Financial crisis causes East Asian economies to experience negative income growth
of around 6%.
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Once again, this paper tests which of these estimation methods provides better estimation
by looking at the F-test (for fixed effects) and LM test (for random effects). Similar to the
benchmark regression output, F-test significantly rejects the null at 1% level, whereas LM test
fails to reject the null at 10% level. Thus, in the East Asian Financial Crisis, fixed effects estimation
is the better model since it provides consistent and unbiased estimators.
The last two columns exhibit the benchmark growth model with 2008 Global Financial
crisis. Surprisingly, the fixed effects model shows that the magnitude of income becomes
higher if the model is controlled for 2008 crisis, implying that countries with higher income
tend to grow faster even though the evidence is very weak (i.e. only significant at 10% level of
confidence). One possible explanation is because countries with relatively higher income,
particularly Singapore, managed to attain income growth beyond 10% after the crisis even
though it recorded negative growth when the crisis struck, whereas countries with relatively
lower income such as Indonesia only achieved stable growth despite the fact that it successfully
avoided negative growth when the crisis struck.
On the other hand, other variables, i.e. capital, FDI and trade, do not differ significantly
from the previous estimations. Finally, the Global Financial Crisis dummy is significant at 5% in
both regressions even though the impact of the crisis is higher in the fixed effects model.
Furthermore, the result is also consistent with the expectation of this paper, i.e. the 2008
Global Financial Crisis has smaller adverse impact on income growth in East Asian economies.
Further Discussion and Analysis
Other than the coefficients for income and trade, estimation results of the model are
inline with expectations and consistent with previous studies. The objective of this section,
thus, is to provide further discussion and analysis on the estimation results. First, the coefficients
for income in the benchmark model as well as the models augmented by the 1997 East Asian
Crisis dummy show insignificant results with signs that are not inline with expectations. However,
the estimation result from the model augmented by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis dummy is
significant at 10% level of significance and similar with previous case it is not of expected sign.
These results indicate that the growth model used in this paper only weakly support Solow’s
(1956) neo-classical growth theory, particularly that that is relating to economic convergence.
Second, all of the estimated coefficients for capital are significant and positive which is
as expected. This shows that capital accumulation is indeed leading to economic growth.
However, estimation results for FDI, which are more significant than those for capital, indicate
the presence of knowledge transfer from the more developed economies to the less developed
one through FDI. These results support the studies conducted by Lim (2001) and Yao and Wei
(2007), which suggest that FDI facilitates externalities and spillover effects that will enhance
efficiency of productivity of local firms. In turn, these will support economic growth.
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Third, all of the estimated coefficients for trade are insignificant and of conflicting signs,
which suggest that the model provides insufficient evidence for us to make any inference
about the correlation between trade openness and income growth. Nevertheless, these results
indicate that the data used in this paper support the study of Chongvilaivan (2010), whose
paper proposes the insignificance of trade variable as the result from the presence of trade
creation or trade diversion. Therefore, the effect of trade on income growth depends on whether
the welfare of trade alliance’s members is increasing at the expense of non-members or not.
Lastly, even though both of the estimation results for crisis dummies show negative sign,
the 1997 East Asian Crisis dummy shows higher magnitude compared to the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis dummy. This is in accordance with expectation since the 1997 East Asian Crisis
was happening in the East Asian region and was a result from causes internal to the region,
including: 1) lack of policy credibility and 2) inadequate financial infrastructure that accompanied
financial deregulations.For the former, as argued by Raisah (2001), this crisis was initially triggered
by abusive state intervention and less effective industrial policies in the region. As for the latter,
financial deregulations inadequate financial infrastructure and poor banking supervision
encouraged risky investments without sufficient risk assessment led the credit bubble and
collapse of the financial sector (for instance, see Radelet and Sachs, 2000). These weak economic
fundamentals reflect the “financial fragility” as the main issue of East Asian economies, which
triggered the crisis in 1997 and hit the region’s economy severely (see Appendix 5 for statistics
on macroeconomic variables during both financial crises). Further, this crisis was deepened due
to its spread to the real sector, which hurt the borrower’s business and, massive capital outflow.
On the other hand, the crisis in 2008 had smaller impacts on the region’s economy since
the region only suffered the “contagious effect” of the crisis that was actually originated in the
developed economies. To some extent, this result supportspaper, which suggests that the
divergence may relate to the externality of the 2008 Global Financial crisis (Chongvilaivan,
2010; Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011). Nevertheless, indeed the improvements in the fundamentals
of East Asian economies prior to 2008 Global Financial Crisis werealso much attributed to the
multidimensional reforms that followed 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis.To be more
specific,Goldstein and Xie (2009) point out that large holdings of foreign reserves, improved
financial structure, high share of regional trade, and stances toward countercyclical monetary
and fiscal policies would assist the region to weather negative impacts from the crisis.
V. CONLUSIONS
World’s financial system, reinforced by development in information technology, has
strengthened financial integration between countries around the world. Despite the advantages
of this advancement, however, financial integration has also caused financial crises to spread
more easily and rapidly, undermining connected economies. Due to this reason,studies about
financial crises have become more important than ever since. In this regard, the objective of
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this study is to better understandthe causes and consequences of the recent financial crises by
providing comprehensive analysis in order to prevent the occurrence, or at least minimize the
impact,of financial crisis in the future.
This study has revealed important findings about the main impacts of financial crises on
East Asian economies. First, this study has investigated the impact of both 1997 East Asian
Financial Crisis and 2008 Global Financial Crisis by using a quantitative approach, i.e. panel
regression. The result shows that even though both crises had adverse effects on the economy
of the region, East Asian economies had become more resilient during the crisis in 2008 compared
to that in 1997. Further, this paper finds out that minimized impact of the crisis in 2008
occurred since, in addition to the “externality” of the crisis, most East Asian economies had
learned its lesson after the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis by strengthening economic
fundamentals, underpinned further better government credibility and accountability.
Concerted efforts to restructure the banking and financial sectorby East Asian governments
that follows the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis had increased resilience to economic crises.
Included in the reforms was better supervision on this sector as opposed to period prior
deregulations and suspensions as well as merging troubled financial institutions. Capital was
also injected to assist with liquidity problem. Apart from banking and financial sector reform,
higher requirement for corporate transparency was also demanded to increase credibility of
the private sectors. Altogether, these reforms had strengthened economic fundamentals of
East Asian countries. Another most important things that had better preparedEast Asian countries
in facing the 2008 Global Financial Crisis was improvement in foreign exchange reserves
condition, which aiding governments in defending the economy during the crisis.
Despite its findings, the scope of this study is limited to country-level data and analysis.
Hence, further studies should focus more on the industry-level analysis and thus have to be
facilitated by the availability of industry-level data in order examine the sensitivity of each
industry in anticipating the financial crises.In addition, the estimation results in this study can
be improved by adding interaction variables between crisis dummy and other independent
variables as well as introducing the GMM estimation in estimating the model in order to capture
the simultaneous equations in the model.
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APPENDIX 5. OTHER MACROECONOMIC STATISTICS
Appendix 5.1.
GDP percapita in East Asian economies (annual growth rate, %)
Appendix 5.2.
Foreign exchange reserves of several East Asian countries (in million)
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